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ABSTRACT
Lack of sanguinity for patent holders was manifest after the Supreme Court’s May 22, 2017, opinion
in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC. Yet whether TC Heartland—a case from
the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware—represents a fait accompli against forum
shopping remains debatable. Writing for the Court in a unanimous opinion, Justice Clarence
Thomas rejected the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s interpretation that an
intervening amendment to the general venue statute broadened the scope of venue for patent cases.
The patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), provides that “[a]ny civil action for patent
infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”
The Court held that the Federal Circuit’s opinion from 1990, VE Holding Corporation v. Johnson
Gas Appliance Company, erred in concluding that the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c),
superseded and redefined the meaning of “resides” to include any district in which the defendant is
subject to personal jurisdiction. Without mentioning the import of the second basis for proper
venue—“where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established
place of business”—the Court determined that a U.S. corporation can only reside in its state of
incorporation.
As unpropitious as TC Heartland is for many patent holders, the case ends only one debate while
sparking others on where a defendant can be sued for patent infringement. TC Heartland did not
decide how to determine venue for foreign corporations. It did not decide where unincorporated
entities—including individuals—reside. And it made no mention of how to interpret the second
clause in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b): “where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a
regular and established place of business.” Although lawyers can shape the contours of these issues,
only the courts with time can discern their meaning. No one knows the import of TC Heartland
yet—not even the courts until cases arrive and decisions are made.
This paper argues that TC Heartland begins—rather than ends—a more nuanced inquiry into what
is proper venue in patent cases. In three parts, the paper describes the rise of East Texas as a nexus
for patent litigation, reviews TC Heartland, and discusses the litigation-tactic implications of the

case. If the perceived trajectory of limiting patent rights remains unabated, a narrow interpretation
of the clause could result in U.S. corporations being subject to patent lawsuits in one of only two
venues: their state of incorporation or principal place of business. Upon threat of such a restrictive
interpretation, for a small business or individual patent holder without the ability to finance
litigation in a distant forum, as-applied challenges surface to vindicate the unconstitutional denial of
the right to access to courts. Left unbridled, TC Heartland could be a double-edged sword for small
businesses, enabling them to avoid defending lawsuits in supposedly prejudicial venues while
dissuading them from filing their own lawsuits for fear of financial ruin in a defendant’s hometown.
The Constitution demands better and offers a salutary solution for patentees asserting public rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Forum shopping in patent litigation is over,” declared one bay-area
practitioner.1 A “seismic shift” and “severe blow to non-practicing entities or ‘patent
trolls,’” observed another from Boston.2 A “staggering blow to the patent assertion
entities and practitioners that had built their business models around exacting
settlement leverage over domestic corporations by forcing them to litigate in
perceived plaintiff-friendly venues,” celebrated a Milwaukee lawyer.3 “[M]any
regular patent defendants can’t be blamed if they start dreaming of staying home the
next time they are sued,” offered a New Yorker.4 The “most significant Supreme
Court decision in patent law in 20 years,” surmised a lawyer from Silicon Valley.5
“The decision is not unexpected considering the court’s recent track record in
overturning the Federal Circuit,” noted a Virginia-based advocate.6

* © Jesse Snyder 2017. 2016–2017 to the Honorable Eugene E. Siler Jr. of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; 2015–2016 Law Clerk to the Honorable Jimmie V. Reyna of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; 2012–2013 Law Clerk to the Honorable
Jorge A. Solis of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. I earned my
J.D., summa cum laude, from Texas Wesleyan University and my B.S. from the United States Air
Force Academy. While in law school, I served as editor in chief of the Texas Wesleyan Law Review.
Thank you for your time and consideration toward publishing my paper. I would like to thank
Kaylee Willis, Deidre Davis, Paul Sanders, and the entire staff of the John Marshall Law School
Review of Intellectual Property Law. I also would like to thank my wife, Amy, for all her support.
1 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Could Hinder ‘Patent Trolls’, THE NEW YORK TIMES
(May
22,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/business/supreme-court-patentlawsuit.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fadamliptak&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=l
atest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection&_r=0; Robert Barnes, Supreme Court limits locations
of
patent
lawsuits,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST,
(May
22,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-makes-it-harder-for-patenttrolls-to-find-friendly-court/2017/05/22/7dba0426-3f20-11e7-adba394ee67a7582_story.html?utm_term=.3756d16b69b9.
2 Attorneys React To Supreme Court Patent Venue Ruling, LAW360 (May 22, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/926933/attorneys-react-to-supreme-court-patent-venue-ruling.
3 Id.
4 Gaston Kroub, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands, 581 U.S. ___ (2017) (Thomas,
J.)., GEO. WASH. L. REV. ON THE DOCKET (Oct. Term 2016), available at http://www.gwlr.org/tcheartland-v-kraft-foods-patent-venue-comes-home/.
5 Attorneys React To Supreme Court Patent Venue Ruling, LAW360 (May 22, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/926933/attorneys-react-to-supreme-court-patent-venue-ruling.
6 Id.
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Lack of sanguinity for patent holders was manifest after the Supreme Court’s
May 22, 2017, opinion in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC.7 Yet
whether TC Heartland—a case from the U.S. District Court for the District of
Delaware—represents a fait accompli against forum shopping remains debatable.
Writing for the Court in a unanimous opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas rejected
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s interpretation that an intervening
amendment to the general venue statute broadened the scope of venue for patent
cases, concluding that “a domestic corporation ‘resides’ only in its State of
incorporation.”8 The patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), provides that “[a]ny
civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the
defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and
has a regular and established place of business.”9 The Court held that the Federal
Circuit’s opinion from 1990, VE Holding Corporation v. Johnson Gas Appliance
Company,10 erred in concluding that the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c),
superseded and redefined the meaning of “resides” to include any district in which
the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.11 Without mentioning the import of
the second basis for proper venue—“where the defendant has committed acts of
infringement and has a regular and established place of business”12—the Court
determined that a U.S. corporation can only reside in its state of incorporation.13 And
with that, the foothold for venue in that case (and many others) gave way as the
Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.14
Although TC Heartland seems like an innocuous opinion about venue, the past
two decades demonstrate why attorneys and litigants care about the outcome.15
Since the Federal Circuit applied the general venue statute to patent law in VE
Holding, for various complicated reasons, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas has become the epicenter for trial-level patent litigation.16 Singledigits patent filings in 1999 gave way to hundreds of cases by 2007.17 East Texas
carried 23% of new patent cases filed in 2012, 25% in 2013, 29% in 2014, 45% in
7 See, e.g., Greg Stohr & Susan Decker, U.S. Supreme Court Puts New Curbs on Locations of
Patent
Suits,
BLOOMBERG
POLITICS
(May
22,
2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-05-22/u-s-supreme-court-puts-new-curbs-onlocations-of-patent-suits (“The Supreme Court decision won’t eliminate arguments over where
lawsuits should be filed but will ‘change the conversation,’ said Mark Whitaker, a patent lawyer
with Morrison & Foerster in Washington and president of the American Intellectual Property Law
Association.”).
8 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 197 L. Ed. 2d 816, 820 (2017).
9 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
10 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
11 TC Heartland, 197 L. Ed. 2d at 823–24 (citation omitted).
12 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
13 TC Heartland, 197 L. Ed. 2d at 824–25 (citation omitted).
14 See id.; Attorneys React To Supreme Court Patent Venue Ruling, LAW360 (May 22, 2017),
available
at
https://www.law360.com/articles/926933/attorneys-react-to-supreme-court-patentvenue-ruling.
15 Erin Coe, Texas in the Rearview Mirror? Glory Days Could be Numbered in the Country’s
Busiest
Patent
Court,
LAW360
(Mar.
27,
2017),
available
at
https://www.law360.com/articles/905388/patent-glory-days-could-be-numbered-for-east-texas;
see
also VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1578.
16 See id.
17 See id.
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2015, and 38% in 2016.18 In 2015, Judge James Rodney Gilstrap of East Texas’s
Marshall Division presided over more than a quarter of all new cases, totaling 1,686
of the 5,819 new cases nationwide.19 A 2015 study adumbrated East Texas as more
likely to decide in a patentee’s favor than other courts.20
To many who sensed unfairness in East Texas, TC Heartland represented a
reprieve from forced litigation in a distant venue.21 Hope endures that cleaving a
solitary Delaware case might have the boomerang effect of purging East Texas and
ricocheting cases back to Delaware.22 But to declare a nigh moratorium on forum
shopping ignores what remains unresolved. Questions indeed remain about whether
TC Heartland is a valedictory farewell to forum shopping.
As unpropitious as TC Heartland is for many patent holders, the case ends only
one debate while sparking others on where a defendant can be sued for patent
infringement. TC Heartland did not decide how to determine venue for foreign
corporations.23
It did not decide where unincorporated entities—including
individuals—reside.24 And it made no mention of how to interpret the second clause
in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b): “where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and
has a regular and established place of business.”25 Although lawyers can shape the
contours of these issues, only the courts with time can discern their meaning. No one
knows the import of TC Heartland yet—not even the courts until cases arrive and
decisions are made.

See id.
Kaleigh Rogers, The Small Town Judge Who Sees a Quarter of the Nation’s Patent Cases,
MOTHERBOARD (May 5, 2016), available at https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/the-smalltown-judge-who-sees-a-quarter-of-the-nations-patent-cases.
20 Brian Fung, The Supreme Court’s big ruling on ‘patent trolls’ will rock businesses everywhere,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(May
23,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2017/05/23/the-supreme-court-just-undercut-patent-trolls-in-a-bigway/?hpid=hp_regional-hp-cards_rhp-cardtechnology%3Ahomepage%2Fcard&utm_term=.e133e7adb4c2.
21 Attorneys React To Supreme Court Patent Venue Ruling, LAW360 (May 22, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/926933/attorneys-react-to-supreme-court-patent-venue-ruling.
22 Erin Coe, Texas in the Rearview Mirror? Glory Days Could be Numbered in the Country’s
Busiest Patent Court, LAW360 (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/905388/patentglory-days-could-be-numbered-for-east-texas.
23 TC Heartland, 197 L. Ed. 2d at 824 n.2 (“The parties dispute the implications of petitioner’s
argument for foreign corporations. We do not here address that question, nor do we express any
opinion on this Court’s holding in Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U.S.
706 (1972) (determining proper venue for foreign corporation under then existing statutory
regime).”).
24 Id. at 821 n.1
The complaint alleged that petitioner is a corporation, and petitioner admitted
this allegation in its answer. Similarly, the petition for certiorari sought review
on the question of “corporate” residence. In their briefs before this Court,
however, the parties suggest that petitioner is, in fact, an unincorporated entity.
Because this case comes to us at the pleading stage and has been litigated on the
understanding that petitioner is a corporation, we confine our analysis to the
proper venue for corporations. We leave further consideration of the issue of
petitioner’s legal status to the courts below on remand.
(internal citations omitted).
25 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
18
19
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This paper argues that TC Heartland begins—rather than ends—a more
nuanced inquiry into what is proper venue in patent cases. In three parts, the paper
describes the rise of East Texas as a nexus for patent litigation, reviews TC
Heartland, and discusses the litigation-tactic implications of the case. Over twenty
years of permissive venue interpretations have transformed a sleepy town in East
Texas into something unforeseen.26 Yet reshuffling cases to New York, California,
and Delaware may or may not be in the offing.27 The immediate effects will be
realized when courts settle on an interpretation of the ancillary (and now likely
primary) clause “where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a
regular and established place of business.”28 If the perceived trajectory of limiting
patent rights remains unabated,29 a narrow interpretation of the clause could result
in U.S. corporations being subject to patent lawsuits in one of only two venues: their
state of incorporation or principal place of business.30 Upon threat of such a
restrictive interpretation, for a small business or individual patent holder without
the ability to finance litigation in a distant forum, as-applied challenges surface to
vindicate the unconstitutional denial of the right to access to courts.31 Left unbridled,
TC Heartland could be a double-edged sword for small businesses, enabling them to
avoid defending lawsuits in supposedly prejudicial venues while dissuading them
from filing their own lawsuits for fear of financial ruin in a defendant’s hometown.
The Constitution demands better and offers a salutary solution for patentees
asserting public rights.

26 Kaleigh Rogers, The Small Town Judge Who Sees a Quarter of the Nation’s Patent Cases,
MOTHERBOARD (May 5, 2016), https://motherboardvice.com/en_us/article/the-small-town-judge-whosees-a-quarter-of-the-nations-patent-cases.
27 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Could Hinder ‘Patent Trolls’, THE NEW YORK TIMES
(May
22,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/business/supreme-court-patentlawsuit.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fadamliptak&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=l
atest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection&_r=0; Robert Barnes, Supreme Court limits locations
of
patent
lawsuits,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST,
(May
22,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-makes-it-harder-for-patenttrolls-to-find-friendly-court/2017/05/22/7dba0426-3f20-11e7-adba394ee67a7582_story.html?utm_term=.3756d16b69b9.
28 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
29 Ronald Mann, Opinion analysis: Justices rein in Federal Circuit’s lax rules on patent venue,
SCOTUSBLOG (May. 23, 2017, 10:16 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/05/opinion-analysisjustices-rein-federal-circuits-lax-rules-patent-venue/ (“Where have I read this before: U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit – patent-holding plaintiffs win; Supreme Court – corporate
defendants win.”); Adam Feldman, The Year of the Patent, EMPIRICAL SCOTUS (May 24, 2017),
https://empiricalscotus.com/2017/05/24/year-of-the-patent/ (“As the Court has in the past, this term
the decisions so far predominately move against increased rights for patent holders.”).
30 See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, No. 16-405, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3395, at *21 (May 30, 2017)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The majority’s approach grants a
jurisdictional windfall to large multistate or multinational corporations that operate across many
jurisdictions. Under its reasoning, it is virtually inconceivable that such corporations will ever be
subject to general jurisdiction in any location other than their principal places of business or of
incorporation.”).
31 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004).
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II. EAST TEXAS AS THE FULCRUM OF TRIAL-LEVEL PATENT LITIGATION
Skating rinks sponsored by Samsung.32
Foreign corporations awarding
scholarships to high-school students.33 Hotels acquiring PACER subscriptions to
entice hotel guests.34 Far from dystopia, those factoids describe Marshall, Texas,
circa 2017.35 That a small town in the Piney Woods of East Texas became a leviathan
venue for patent disputes is no accident.36
A. Interpretation and Reinterpretation of Proper Venue Under Patent Law
At the founding, the Judiciary Act of 1789 permitted plaintiffs to sue in federal
district courts if the defendant was “an inhabitant” of that district or could be “found”
for service of process in that district.37 That law covered patent cases and other civil
lawsuits.38 Almost one-hundred years later, in 1887, Congress amended the statute
to permit lawsuits in the district of which the defendant was an inhabitant or, in
diversity cases, either district of which the plaintiff or defendant was an inhabitant.39
In 1897, Congress enacted a patent-specific venue statute, which the Supreme
Court described as an act that “placed patent infringement cases in a class by
themselves, outside the scope of general venue legislation.”40 The forerunner to 28
U.S.C. § 1400(b) permitted patent lawsuits in either the district of which the
defendant was an “inhabitant” or in which the defendant both maintained a “regular
and established place of business” and committed an act of infringement.41 At the
time, U.S. corporations were considered inhabitants of their states of incorporation
only.42
In Stonite Products Company v. Melvin Lloyd Company, Justice Frank Murphy
in 1942 construed that patent venue provision as “the exclusive provision controlling
venue in patent infringement proceedings,” rebuffing the argument that provisions
attendant to general venue supplemented or modified its effects.43 The patent venue
statute, the Court explained, “was adopted to define the exact jurisdiction of the
federal courts in actions to enforce patent rights,” a purpose undermined by
32 Kaleigh Rogers, The Small Town Judge Who Sees a Quarter of the Nation’s Patent Cases,
MOTHERBOARD (May 5, 2016), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/the-small-town-judge-whosees-a-quarter-of-the-nations-patent-cases.
33 Id.
34 Matthew Bultman, Patent Venue’s Big Day In Court: What You Need To Know, LAW360 (Mar.
23, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/904976/patent-venue-s-big-day-in-court-what-you-needto-know.
35 Id.
36 Ronald Mann, Argument preview: Justices to consider venue for patent litigation,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 20, 2017, 5:04 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/argument-previewjustices-consider-venue-patent-litigation/.
37 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 197 L. Ed. 2d 816, 821–22 (2017)
(citation omitted).
38 Id. (citation omitted).
39 Id. (citation omitted).
40 Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 713 (1972).
41 TC Heartland, 197 L. Ed. 2d at 822 (citation omitted).
42 Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444, 449–50 (1892).
43 Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 563 (1942).
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interpreting it “to dovetail with the general provisions relating to the venue of civil
suits.”44 Justice Murphy emphasized that the patent statute “alone should control
venue in patent infringement proceedings.”45
In 1948, Congress recodified the patent venue statute as 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).46
With its original language still intact, § 1400(b) prescribes “[a]ny civil action for
patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant
resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a
regular and established place of business.”47 At the same time, Congress enacted the
general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which defined “residence” for corporate
defendants: “A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district
shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.”48
Following the 1948 legislation, a split of authority developed on whether “resides” as
found in § 1400(b) assimilated § 1391(c)’s definition of “residence.”49
In Fourco Glass Company v. Transmirra Products Corporation, the Supreme
Court reviewed a 1957 appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
reiterating the rationale of Stonite and concluding that § 1400(b) “is the sole and
exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions, and . . . is not to
be supplemented by . . . § 1391(c).”50 Justice Charles Evans Whittaker explained that
Congress enacted § 1400(b) as a standalone venue statute with nothing in the 1948
recodification evincing intent to alter that status.51 That § 1391(c) by “its terms”
embraced “all actions,” Justice Whittaker observed, did not overcome the design of §
1400(b) as “complete, independent and alone controlling in its sphere.”52 The Court
concluded that “resides” in § 1400(b) bore the same meaning as “inhabit[s]” in the
pre-1948 version: U.S. corporations reside for venue purposes only in their states of
incorporation.53
In 1988, Congress again amended the general venue statute, adding the
prefatory phrase “[f]or purposes of venue under this chapter” and directing “a
defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in
which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.”54
Two years later, in 1990, the Federal Circuit—newly constituted with exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals unique to patent law 55—heard a case on how this
amendment affected the meaning of the patent venue statute.56

Id. at 565–66.
Id. at 566.
46 TC Heartland, 197 L. Ed. 2d at 822 (citation omitted).
47 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1952).
48 TC Heartland, 197 L. Ed. 2d at 822–23 (citation omitted).
49 Id. (citation omitted).
50 Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 224 (1957).
51 Id. at 228 (citation omitted).
52 Id. (citation omitted).
53 Id. at 226 (citation omitted).
54 TC Heartland, 197 L. Ed. 2d at 823–24 (citation omitted).
55 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295.
56 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (1990). Those who visit and
attend oral argument at the Federal Circuit can find Judge Plager’s commissioned portrait in
Courtroom 403.
44
45
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In VE Holding, Judge S. Jay Plager wrote for the appeals court that the 1988
amendment to § 1391(c) displaced previous conceptions of the patent venue statute.57
Judge Plager reasoned that the phrase “[f]or purposes of venue under this chapter”
was “exact and classic language of incorporation,”58 establishing the prevailing
definition for all other venue statutes under the same chapter.59 Judge Plager
explained that § 1391(c) “on its face . . . clearly applies to § 1400(b),” “redefin[ing] the
meaning of the term ‘resides’ in that section.”60 By that read, according to the
Federal Circuit, the “first test for venue under § 1400(b) with respect to a defendant
that is a corporation, in light of the 1988 amendment to § 1391(c), is whether the
defendant became subject to personal jurisdiction in the district of suit at the time
the action commenced.”61
Following VE Holding, congressional developments on patent venue stalled until
Congress amended § 1391 in 2011, leaving § 1400(b) unaltered yet again.62 During
that time, Congress made substantial substantive amendments to the Patent Act.63
Section 1391(a) begins with the phrase “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,”
before prescribing that “this section shall govern the venue of all civil actions brought
in district courts of the United States.”64 Congress replaced “under this chapter”
from § 1391(c), amending the section to read “[f]or all venue purposes,” certain
entities, “whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in
any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal
jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.”65
Although the language of § 1400(b) has remained selfsame for almost a century,
interpretations and reinterpretations of that statute have produced exceptional
results.66 Among those included the emergence of East Texas as a prominent venue
for patent litigation.
B. The Spark that Ignited Patent Cases in East Texas
The influx of patent litigation in East Texas surprised Judge T. John Ward as
much as anyone: “I did not anticipate, in any way, that it would create such a large
attraction. I adopted those rules for one purpose and one unexpected consequence
was eighteen months from filing to trial was very attractive to a lot of people. I did
not anticipate that.”67
Marshall, home of football icon Earl Campbell, sits at the intersection I-20 (the
interstate between Dallas and Atlanta) and Texas Highway 59 (the highway between
Id. at 1583.
Id. at 1579.
59 Id. at 1580.
60 Id. at 1578.
61 Id. at 1583.
62 TC Heartland, 197 L. Ed. 2d at 823–24 (2017) (citation omitted).
63 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016) (“In 2011, Congress enacted
the statute before us.”).
64 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
65 Id. at § 1391(c)(2).
66 Supra note 19.
67 Id.
57
58

[17:232 2017] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

240

Houston and Texarkana).68 It is one division within the Eastern District of Texas,
and it encompasses six counties and fourteen cities.69 Next door to Marshall is Tyler,
the headquarters of the Eastern District of Texas.70
From the 1970s through 1990s, high-stakes litigation in East Texas was
commonplace and lucrative for personal-injury attorneys.71
“Marshall-based
plaintiffs’ lawyers generated tens of millions of dollars in fees—and grabbed the
national spotlight—by pursuing class-action lawsuits against companies that used
asbestos and silica, and against the pharmaceutical and tobacco industries.”72 As the
1990s closed, however, Texas had enacted tort reform measures, capping medical
malpractice, punitive damages, and the availability of attorney’s fees.73 The number
of personal-injury cases filed in East Texas has since plummeted.74 Still, as one judge
commented, “historically anyway [East Texas] is a plaintiffs-oriented district.”75
Soon after Judge Ward was sworn into the Marshall Division of the Eastern
District of Texas in September 1999, the number of patent-infringement lawsuits in
Marshall began to climb.76 One year before assuming office, Judge Ward served as
local counsel on a patent case implicating Texas Instruments.77 Judge Ward would
later describe conversations in which his co-counsel from San Francisco lamented
that East Texas did not have the same rules they enjoyed in California.78 After
taking the bench, Judge Ward remembered those conversations and sought to rectify
the situation by adopting similar practices in his court. He hoped, as he later
reflected, to catalyze quick resolutions in patent cases, which he perceived as more
burdensome than other civil cases.79
In an effort to better manage the docket, Judge Ward oversaw in 2001 the
implementation of local patent rules, which streamlined discovery, required
disclosure of infringement and invalidity theories early in the case, and forced cases
to trial or settlement more quickly.80 These rules and procedures also had the effect
of moving cases in a predictable manner without much judicial involvement or
structures to address the merits early.81 District courts generally assign priority to
68 Ronald Mann, Argument preview: Justices to consider venue for patent litigation,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 20, 2017, 5:04 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/argument-previewjustices-consider-venue-patent-litigation/.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Timothy C. Meece & V. Bryan Medlock, Jr., Is TS Tech the Death Knell for Patent Litigation
in the Eastern District of Texas?, 16 IP LITIGATOR 6 (Nov./Dec. 2009), available at
https://bannerwitcoff.com/_docs/library/articles/IPTLJ%20Medlock%20Meece.pdf.
72 Id. (citation omitted).
73 Id. (citation omitted).
74 Id. (citation omitted).
75 Id. (citation omitted).
76 Id. (citation omitted).
77 Kaleigh Rogers, The Small Town Judge Who Sees a Quarter of the Nation’s Patent Cases,
MOTHERBOARD (May 5, 2016), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/the-small-town-judge-whosees-a-quarter-of-the-nations-patent-cases.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Erin Coe, Texas in the Rearview Mirror? Glory Days Could be Numbered in the Country’s
Busiest Patent Court, LAW360 (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/905388/patentglory-days-could-be-numbered-for-east-texas.
81 Id.
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criminal cases, rescheduling the civil docket as necessary to accommodate criminal
trials.82 With a low-by-comparison criminal docket amounting to 10% of its caseload,
Marshall had greater flexibility to attend to civil cases than other courts.83 Although
local rules promoting efficiency helped courts in California manage large caseloads,
consonant rules in Marshall had the effect of propelling the guarantee of trial within
two years.84
The upshot of the new procedures was a rise from single-digit patent cases in
1999 to 369 by 2007.85 As patent cases flocked in, the goal of getting to trial within
eighteen months became aspirational.86 That metric edged closer to three years
when Judge Ward retired in 2011, but by then, East Texas had established itself as
the de facto patent venue.87 The local market reacted, stimulating catering
businesses, hotels and restaurants attuned to lawyers, foreign sponsorships for local
activities, and attention by national firms with otherwise attenuated connections to
the forum.88 Judge Gilstrap assumed Judge Ward’s seat in 2011, continuing the
practices adopted by his predecessor.89
In each year from 2012 to 2016, East Texas drew the most new patent filings of
all district courts, with Delaware coming in second.90 East Texas carried 23% of new
patent cases filed in 2012, 25% in 2013, 29% in 2014, 45% in 2015, and 38% in 2016.91
In 2015, Judge Gilstrap presided over more than a quarter of all new cases, totaling
1,686 of the 5,819 new cases nationwide—twice as many as the next most active
judge.92 Against conventional wisdom, from 2007 to 2016, 67% of jury and bench
trials favored patentees in East Texas, while 68% of trials came out in their favor in
Delaware.93 Median jury awards were $12.3 million and $14 million, respectively.94
Reports extrapolating and interpreting this information conclude that, while East
Texas does not disproportionately favor plaintiffs on the merits when compared to
82 Kaleigh Rogers, The Small Town Judge Who Sees a Quarter of the Nation’s Patent Cases,
MOTHERBOARD (May 5, 2016), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/the-small-town-judge-whosees-a-quarter-of-the-nations-patent-cases.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Erin Coe, Texas in the Rearview Mirror? Glory Days Could be Numbered in the Country’s
Busiest Patent Court, LAW360 (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/905388/patentglory-days-could-be-numbered-for-east-texas.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.; Kaleigh Rogers, The Small Town Judge Who Sees a Quarter of the Nation’s Patent Cases,
MOTHERBOARD (May 5, 2016), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/the-small-town-judge-whosees-a-quarter-of-the-nations-patent-cases.
89 Id.
90 Erin Coe, Texas in the Rearview Mirror? Glory Days Could be Numbered in the Country’s
Busiest Patent Court, LAW360 (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/905388/patentglory-days-could-be-numbered-for-east-texas.
91 Id.
92 Kaleigh Rogers, The Small Town Judge Who Sees a Quarter of the Nation’s Patent Cases,
MOTHERBOARD (May 5, 2016), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/the-small-town-judge-whosees-a-quarter-of-the-nations-patent-cases.
93 Erin Coe, Texas in the Rearview Mirror? Glory Days Could be Numbered in the Country’s
Busiest Patent Court, LAW360 (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/905388/patentglory-days-could-be-numbered-for-east-texas.
93 Id.
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[17:232 2017] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

242

other districts, far more of its cases appear to result in settlements, which likely has
to do with defendants having a harder time winning at summary judgment.95
Practitioners bemoaned East Texas as solicitous to the litigation strategies
of plaintiffs:
Speed is not good for defendants. Plaintiffs can research an entire case
before filing their complaint, but defendants can’t do all the research, and
invalidity arguments are difficult to come up with on the fly. Plus, they face
the threat of having to go to trial and face a jury. Defendants don’t like that
either.96
They point to the propensity of judges in that district to deny motions to transfer
as evidence of a pro-patentee reputation.97 Critics of East Texas also suggest that its
rules and practices enable and encourage patent tolls—otherwise known as nonpracticing entities—whose business models include purchasing patents for the
purpose of filing patent lawsuits.98 A hackneyed view of these entities is that they
acquire older patents with broad terms and exact settlements on threat of litigation.99
In 2011, just as Judge Gilstrap succeeded Judge Ward, activities attributed to patent
trolls cost U.S. companies $29 billion.100 Still some note an upward trend starting
2012 of greater in frequency defense victories at summary judgment and trial.101
Judge Gilstrap has maintained that local practices do not affect fairness or
impartiality: “I try to make sure both sides get a fair trial. I don’t have a client in the
case, other than seeing that rules are applied equally and fairly and you’ll get a fair
trial. That’s what I strive to do.”102 While some suggest that the numbers imply
complicity to stimulate the local economy through attractive incentives for large
verdicts,103 no one can credibly argue that East Texas had any say in the Federal
Circuit’s opinion in VE Holding or the actual decisions by plaintiffs on where to file
lawsuits. Perhaps a more apt assessment is that East Texas built on what it was
provided.
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100 See id.
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III. TC HEARTLAND ENDS ONE DEBATE WHILE IGNITING NEW ONES
Companies unhappy with the outsized role of East Texas in patent litigation
began to agitate for venue reform, pursuing legislative reform in tandem with legal
challenges to the extant understanding of patent venue.104 After Kraft Foods Group
Brand, LLC (“Kraft”) sued TC Heartland, LLC (“TC Heartland”) in Delaware for
patent infringement, TC Heartland took the latter option.105 TC Heartland initially
pressed before the District Court of Delaware and Federal Circuit that the 2011
amendments to the general venue statute restored Fourco.106 After its position proved
unavailing in the lower courts, TC Heartland refined that argument in its petition for
writ of certiorari, homing in on the idea that VE Holding was incorrect because the
1988 amendments did not supplant Fourco.107 And just like that, a case immediately
about Delaware eventually became a case about East Texas.
A. Whether the 2011 Amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 Change the Venue Analysis
Under VE Holding
In 2014, Kraft asserted claims from three patents against TC Heartland in
Delaware.108
TC Heartland, organized under and headquartered in Indiana,
developed and manufactured low-calorie sweeteners for water.109 Kraft accused those
products of patent infringement, and TC Heartland moved to transfer the case to
Indiana.110
TC Heartland asserted that the general venue statute (28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)) had
been amended in 2011 with the effect of restoring the patent venue statute (28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b)) to its understanding before the Federal Circuit’s opinion in VE Holding,
whereby reinstituting the Supreme Court’s holding in Fourco.111 Under Fourco, TC
104 Gaston Kroub, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands, 581 U.S. ___ (2017)
(Thomas, J.)., GEO. WASH. L. REV. ON THE DOCKET (Oct. Term 2016), available at
http://www.gwlr.org/tc-heartland-v-kraft-foods-patent-venue-comes-home/.
105 Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. TC Heartland, LLC, No. 14-28-LPS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
106515, at *41 (D. Del. Aug. 13, 2015).
106 Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC v. TC Heartland, LLC, No. 14-28-LPS, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 127972, at *4–5 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 2015)
The Report also correctly concluded that the 2011 Jurisdiction and Venue
Clarification Act’s amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 did not undo the Federal
Circuit’s decision in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d
1574, 1575, 1579–84 (Fed. Cir. 1990), that ‘Section 1391(c) applies to all of chapter
87 of title 28, and thus to § 1400(b)’ and venue is appropriate for a defendant in a
patent infringement case where personal jurisdiction exists. Plaintiff cites Federal
Circuit and other district court decisions post-dating the 2011 amendment and
reaffirming the vitality of the holding of VE Holding.
107 Kate
Howard, Petition of the day, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 17, 2016, 11:23 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/10/petition-of-the-day-1013.
108 TC Heartland, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106515, at *2–4 (citation omitted).
109 Id. at *2 (citation omitted); Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Considers Why Patent Trolls Love
Texas,
THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Mar.
27,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/business/supreme-court-patent-trolls-tc-heartland-kraft.html.
110 TC Heartland, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106515, at *2–4.
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Heartland asserted, venue is proper in its residence of Indiana.112 Conceding that §
1400(b) has remained unaltered since its enactment, TC Heartland argued that the
2011 amendments added to § 1391(a) the prefatory phrase “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by law” and changed the introduction of § 1391(c) from “[f]or the purposes of
venue under this chapter . . . .” to “[f]or all venue purposes . . . .”113 Adding an
exception to a provision otherwise applicable for all venue interpretations, said TC
Heartland, brought back the meaning of § 1400(b) under Fourco.114
In 2015, Magistrate Judge Christopher J. Burke recommended denying the
motion to transfer because VE Holding controlled and the 2011 amendments to §
1391(c) furthered that precedent by confirming that that provision should apply “[f]or
all venue purposes.”115 Judge Burke suggested that the sections “can be read to be in
harmony” without conflict because the supplanted language of § 1400(b) remained
unaltered during the 2011 amendments.116 District Judge Leonard Stark adopted the
recommendation in full, concluding that the 2011 amendments “did not undo the
Federal Circuit’s decision.”117 In 2015, TC Heartland filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus in the Federal Circuit, requesting that the appellate court direct the
District of Delaware to dismiss or transfer the case to the Southern District of
Indiana.118
The Federal Circuit heard oral argument on the petition for writ of mandamus
in March 2016. Professor John Duffy, on behalf of TC Heartland, contended at oral
argument that “the language that the court relied on in VE Holding has been
repealed by Congress.”119 Professor Duffy exhorted that the 2011 amendments
displaced VE Holding, while refraining from any argument that VE Holding was
decided incorrect ab initio in view of Fourco.120 He conceded that VE Holding
controlled before that 2011 amendments and that the phrase “except as otherwise
provided by law” implicitly referenced VE Holding as binding caselaw.121 Circuit
Judge Kimberly Ann Moore made clear her view that that phrase could only
reference VE Holding, removing any force from the 2011 amendments.122 Judge
Moore also suggested that Professor Duffy’s argument was “attenuated,” noting that
congressional reports had discussed VE Holding and yet never amended the
reticulated statutory scheme to alter the status quo ante.123 Judge Moore colored the
congressional reports on venue as instances where “it’s like you make a mess in your
Id. at *25–26.
See In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
114 See id.
115 TC Heartland, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106515, at *26.
116 Id. at *27.
117 Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC v. TC Heartland, LLC, No. 14-28-LPS, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 127972, at *4 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 2015).
118 See In re TC Heartland LLC, No. 2016-105, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19469 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 26,
2015).
119 Oral Argument Search, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argumentrecordings/search/audio.html?title=TC+Heartland&field_case_number_value=&field_date_value2%5
Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=.
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121 See id.
122 See id.
123 See id.
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bed and then blame it on your sibling,” suggesting that Congress has castigated VE
Holding but has never done anything about it.124
In 2016, the Federal Circuit denied the petition for writ of mandamus,
concluding that TC Heartland “failed to show that its right to mandamus is clear and
indisputable.”125 Writing for the panel—all of whom appointees from different
presidents, none of whom were court members during VE Holding126—Judge Moore
observed that a writ of mandamus “is an extraordinary remedy appropriate only in
exceptional circumstances,”127 concluding that TC Heartland “has presented no
evidence which supports its view that Congress intended to codify Fourco in its 2011
amendments.” “Even if Congress’ 2011 amendments were meant to capture existing
federal common law,” Judge Moore continued, “Fourco was not and is not the
prevailing law that would have been captured.”128 The court made no reference to
any argument challenging VE Holding, and TC Heartland did not petition for
rehearing en banc to overturn VE Holding.
B. Venue Dispute Redux: The Efficacy of VE Holding in View of the 1988 Amendments
TC Heartland filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that the Federal
Circuit’s interpretation of the patent venue statute has “dramatically expanded
venue in patent cases, producing a plague of forum shopping.”129 TC Heartland
pivoted from its argument about the import of the 2011 amendments, reframing the
question presented as whether 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) “is the sole and exclusive
provision governing venue in patent infringement actions and is not to be
supplemented by” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).130 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
the Federal Circuit in December 2016.131
Ahead of oral argument, Professor Ronald Mann noted that “[t]he case is
significant because it throws a spotlight on the bizarre and accelerating
concentration of patent litigation in the Piney Woods of East Texas.”132 TC Heartland
argued that the patent statute reflects the specialized realities of patent litigation,
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urging that trivial alterations to § 1391 did not upend Fourco.133 Kraft countered
that a natural tie exists between residence under § 1391(c) and § 1400(b), explaining
that Congress has considered many times whether to solve this venue problem but
has never acted despite adopting other important revisions to the Patent Act.134
The case generated over 30 amicus briefs on the issue of venue.135 Aside from
filings on the abusive nature of forum shopping, certain of the briefs espoused the
value of a small number of courts developing expertise in patent matters, while
others suggested that pharmaceutical companies should be free to sue generic drug
manufacturers in a singular court.136 Professor Mann predicted that the law is
“malleable enough to support a rejection of the status quo,” while cautioning that the
Court’s “level of outrage may have to be pretty high to persuade them to step in
where Congress has declined to tread.”137
The Court heard oral argument in March 2017, with many commentators
reserving predictions and slating the case “for a long period of deliberation.”138
Justice Thomas was taciturn, while Justice Stephen G. Breyer dominated the air
time among the justices.139 Justice Anthony M. Kennedy asked if “generous jury
verdicts enter into this, or is that something we shouldn’t think about?” William M.
Jay, representing Kraft, responded that the record was inconclusive on verdict
values, warning that “the rule that my friends on the other side are proposing” would
overcrowd courts in Delaware.140 Jay stressed that complaints about East Texas “are
problems that should be dealt with on their own terms” through localized action.141
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James Dabney, representing TC Heartland, encountered little interest in the
“horror stories about the concentration of venue in the Eastern District of Texas.”142
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg pressed Dabney on how to construe proper venue: “Is
there any other . . . venue provision in which venue for a corporation is only the place
of incorporation? . . . Principal place of business counts. It doesn’t count under
1400!”143 Justice Elena Kagan seemed insouciant about the state of affairs: “For 30
years the Federal Circuit has been ignoring our decision, and the law has effectively
been otherwise. . . . Sometimes we have accidental theme days at the Supreme Court.
So today’s accidental theme is: When 30 years of practice goes against you, what
happens?”144 Dabney reminded that “[t]his Court has again and again and again
stood up for its authority to declare what the law is.”145 Justice Breyer expressed no
preoccupation about forum shopping: “[T]hese amici briefs . . . they’re filled with this
thing about a Texas district which they think has too many cases. What’s th[at] got
to do with this?”146 Justice Breyer seemed inclined to ignore the controversy: “As far
as I can see, if we’re supposed to decide what’s good or bad, maybe you’d lose. But I
don’t know whether that’s good, bad or indifferent.”147 If anyone seemed disturbed
about forum shopping, it was Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.: “So we shouldn’t
worry that 25% of the nationwide cases are there?”
Roughly two months after oral argument, the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, concluding in an unanimous opinion by Justice Thomas that a U.S.
corporation “resides,” for purposes of § 1400(b), only in its state of incorporation.148
Justice Thomas began by noting that § 1400(b) has remained unaltered since Fourco
and that neither party requested reconsideration of that holding.149 The Court then
observed that “[w]hen Congress intends to effect a change [in how venue is
interpreted], it ordinarily provides a relatively clear indication of its intent in the text
of the amended provision.”150 Prefatory phrases like “[f]or purposes of venue under
this chapter” in 1988 and “[f]or all venue purposes” in 2011, the Court explained, do
not “suggest that Congress intended” reconsideration of Fourco.151 Justice Thomas
142 Ronald Mann, Argument analysis: Justices hear horror stories about venue for patent
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buttressed the analysis by referencing the saving clause of the 2011 amendment
(“otherwise provided by law”), concluding that the clause made “explicit the
qualification that [Fourco] previously found implicit in the statute.”152 The effect of
no congressional override, the Court clarified, was that Fourco controls and that
“resides” under § 1400(b) can only mean a U.S. corporation’s state of incorporation.153
Justice Thomas closed with noting that no indication exists “that Congress in 2011
ratified the Federal Circuit’s decision in VE Holding.”154
Following the release of TC Heartland, Professor Mann reflected that the case
demonstrates a broader trend of limiting patent-infringement exposure: “Where have
I read this before: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—patent-holding
plaintiffs win; Supreme Court—corporate defendants win.”155 Professor Mann
observed that the appeals court “can’t win even when it decides that patent litigation
should follow the well-developed rules of mainstream civil procedure!”156
A rule precluding venue in Delaware for the solitary case at bar exemplified, to
some, a referendum against East Texas and a possible stimulus for Delaware forum
selection.157 TC Heartland’s chief executive celebrated the accomplishment by
describing the long road accused infringers have traversed in vindicating their venue
rights: “Individuals and businesses in the U.S. have been unfairly required for
decades to defend patent suits in far off locales adding cost, complexity and
unpredictably to the intellectual property marketplace.”158 Professor Greg Reilly
offered a similar sentiment: “This is a positive step for those who think there is a
problem of a lot of poor-quality patents being enforced.”159 The spokesperson for
Kraft was glum: “While we are disappointed in the Supreme Court’s ruling on this
procedural matter, we respect the court’s opinion and do not believe it has any
impact on the ultimate outcome of our case.”160 Mark Whitaker, president of the
American Intellectual Property Law Association, was more measured, observing that
TC Heartland will “change the conversation” about venue and require “a more
nuanced approach” to venue selection.161
As notable as the case was for what it decided, its eventual notoriety may come
from what it did not decide. TC Heartland did not decide how to determine venue for
foreign corporations.162 It did not decide where unincorporated entities—including
Id. at 825 (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
154 Id. (citation omitted).
155 Ronald Mann, Opinion analysis: Justices rein in Federal Circuit’s lax rules on patent venue,
SCOTUSBLOG (May. 23, 2017, 10:16 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/05/opinion-analysisjustices-rein-federal-circuits-lax-rules-patent-venue/.
156 Id.
157 Attorneys React To Supreme Court Patent Venue Ruling, LAW360 (May 22, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/926933/attorneys-react-to-supreme-court-patent-venue-ruling.
158 Andrew Chung, U.S. top court tightens patent suit rules in blow to ‘patent trolls’, REUTERS
(May 22, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-kraft-heinz-idUSKBN18I1SZ.
159 Id.
160 Greg Stohr & Susan Decker, U.S. Supreme Court Puts New Curbs on Locations of Patent
Suits, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (May 22, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-0522/u-s-supreme-court-puts-new-curbs-on-locations-of-patent-suits.
161 Id.
162 TC Heartland, 197 L. Ed. 2d at 824 n.2 (“The parties dispute the implications of petitioner’s
argument for foreign corporations. We do not here address that question, nor do we express any
opinion on this Court’s holding in Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U.S.
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individuals—reside.163 And it made no mention of how to interpret the remaining
venue provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b): “where the defendant has committed acts of
infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”164 Professor
Mann, unlike many consigning forum shopping to the dustbin of patent litigation,165
estimated that TC Heartland “certainly will pave the way for further litigation about
the venue status of the many non-corporate businesses involved in patent litigation,
for whom a single-jurisdiction venue rule would be even more remarkable than it is
for corporations.”166
Amid asymmetric views of forum shopping and venue, TC Heartland starts
rather than ends the conversation about patent venue.167 The case left many issues
undecided, including how to interpret “where the defendant has committed acts of
infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”168 That question
will continue to dominate the venue discussion until its scope is resolved. The
erstwhile interpretation of “resides” had its limelight, now fading away as another
venue provision comes to the fore.
IV. LINGERING ISSUES: “REGULAR AND ESTABLISHED PLACE OF BUSINESS” FOR U.S.
CORPORATIONS AND AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
PATENT ACT’S VENUE PROVISION
The aftereffects of TC Heartland will take time to register. The debate remains
live about where unincorporated entities and foreigners can be sued as well as where
U.S. corporations have regular, established businesses. As a result, patentees
706 (1972) (determining proper venue for foreign corporation under then existing statutory
regime).”).
163 Id. at 821 n.1
The complaint alleged that petitioner is a corporation, and petitioner admitted
this allegation in its answer. Similarly, the petition for certiorari sought review
on the question of “corporate” residence. In their briefs before this Court,
however, the parties suggest that petitioner is, in fact, an unincorporated entity.
Because this case comes to us at the pleading stage and has been litigated on the
understanding that petitioner is a corporation, we confine our analysis to the
proper venue for corporations. We leave further consideration of the issue of
petitioner’s legal status to the courts below on remand.
(internal citations omitted).
164 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
165 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Could Hinder ‘Patent Trolls’, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (May 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/business/supreme-court-patentlawsuit.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fadamliptak&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=l
atest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection&_r=0.
166 Ronald Mann, Opinion analysis: Justices rein in Federal Circuit’s lax rules on patent
venue, SCOTUSBLOG (May. 23, 2017, 10:16 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/05/opinionanalysis-justices-rein-federal-circuits-lax-rules-patent-venue/.
167 Attorneys React To Supreme Court Patent Venue Ruling, LAW360 (May 22, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/926933/attorneys-react-to-supreme-court-patent-venue-ruling
(“The Supreme Court’s TC Heartland decision is the most significant Supreme Court decision in
patent law in 20 years, putting cap on the court’s reshaping of patent litigation over the last
decade.”).
168 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
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contemplating filing a lawsuit will hesitate and have to reconfigure their venue
stratagem.169 Lawsuits may shift in greater concretion to corporate-resident states
like Delaware, New York, and California.170 TC Heartland could strengthen motions
to transfer on the basis that an explicit reference to corporate residence militates in
favor of transfer.171 The case may stimulate a rise in multi-district litigation as
lawsuits involving rafts of defendants wane.172 And perhaps litigation costs (and the
concomitant need for patent attorneys) will decrease in some measure.173 But, really,
no one knows for sure. That uncertainty arises in part from the possibility of future
legislation.174 And that uncertainty arises in part because courts and litigants still
have to contend with the meaning of the second part of the venue provision
facilitating lawsuits “where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and
has a regular and established place of business.”175 To engage TC Heartland requires
engaging the unresolved language in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) and the constitutional
implications of a narrow interpretation on an impecunious patentee’s right to access
to courts.
169 Gaston Kroub, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands, 581 U.S. ___ (2017)
(Thomas, J.)., GEO. WASH. L. REV. ON THE DOCKET (Oct. Term 2016), http://www.gwlr.org/tcheartland-v-kraft-foods-patent-venue-comes-home/.
170 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Could Hinder ‘Patent Trolls’, THE NEW YORK TIMES
(May
22,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/business/supreme-court-patentlawsuit.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fadamliptak&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=l
atest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection&_r=0; Robert Barnes, Supreme Court limits locations
of
patent
lawsuits,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST,
(May
22,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-makes-it-harder-for-patenttrolls-to-find-friendly-court/2017/05/22/7dba0426-3f20-11e7-adba394ee67a7582_story.html?utm_term=.3756d16b69b9.
171 Gaston Kroub, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands, 581 U.S. ___ (2017)
(Thomas, J.)., GEO. WASH. L. REV. ON THE DOCKET (Oct. Term 2016), http://www.gwlr.org/tcheartland-v-kraft-foods-patent-venue-comes-home/.
172 Dennis Crouch, Supreme Court Reins In Patent Venue, PATENTLYO (May 22, 2017),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/05/supreme-court-reins-patent.html (“With less concentrated
venue, I we can also expect a rise in multi-district litigation.”).
173 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Could Hinder ‘Patent Trolls’, THE NEW YORK TIMES
(May
22,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/business/supreme-court-patentlawsuit.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fadamliptak&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=l
atest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection&_r=0; Robert Barnes, Supreme Court limits locations
of
patent
lawsuits,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST,
(May
22,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-makes-it-harder-for-patenttrolls-to-find-friendly-court/2017/05/22/7dba0426-3f20-11e7-adba394ee67a7582_story.html?utm_term=.3756d16b69b9.
174 Greg Stohr & Susan Decker, U.S. Supreme Court Puts New Curbs on Locations of Patent
Suits, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (May 22, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-0522/u-s-supreme-court-puts-new-curbs-on-locations-of-patent-suits (“Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Orrin Hatch, a Utah Republican, also applauded the court’s decision and said he plans to
introduce legislation ‘in the coming months to address other problems with our current patent
litigation system.’”).
175 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1976); see also Walter Olson, Patent Defendants Win a Big One, CATO AT
LIBERTY (May 22, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/patent-defendants-win-big-one (“From here out,
defendants can still be sued in a district such as E.D. Tex. if they have a regular and established
place of business in it, but the decision is likely to shrink what I called in my January preview a
‘jackpot patent litigation sector . . . that shifts around billions of dollars.’”).
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A. The Immediate Question Facing Courts: What is the Meaning of “Regular and
Established Place of Business”?
TC Heartland resolved part of one axis of a dual-axial inquiry. On one axis of §
1400(b), a patent infringement lawsuit may be filed “in the judicial district where the
defendant resides”; on the other axis venue is proper “where the defendant has
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of
business.”176 TC Heartland interpreted the former as to U.S. corporations, but the
case said nothing about the latter.177 Only interpretation by the courts—including
the Supreme Court if (when) discretionary review is granted—can distill what the
unresolved second axis means. At least as to U.S. corporations, where courts
eventually fall on the issue will depend on the gravitation pull of precedent and the
inclination to hew toward a trend established by the Supreme Court about how to
view patent law.
In 1985, in In re Cordis Corp., the Federal Circuit had occasion to address the
meaning of the second clause within § 1400(b), concluding that “the appropriate
inquiry is whether the corporate defendant does its business in that district through
a permanent and continuous presence.”178 The Federal Circuit rejected argument
that “a fixed physical presence in the sense of a formal office or store” is required to
establish venue.179 The court was reticent beyond that, leaving future cases to decide
what constitutes permanent and continuous as well as the impact of thenunforeseeable global commerce through the advent of the internet.
Cases from the 1960s and 1970s—before the establishment of the Federal
Circuit and sophistication modern business transactions—also offer insight into how
this clause may apply in patent cases.180 Those cases, for the most part, are
consistent with the Federal Circuit’s interpretation, differing by the degree to which
a physical presence is necessary.
The Seventh and Sixth Circuits suggest that something physical and permanent
is required. In Dual Manufacturing and Engineering, Inc. v. Burris Industries, Inc.,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that a “defendant would have a regular and
established place of business if it exercised control over the operation of a permanent
office.”181 In that case, a 10-year lease of a “showroom-office” sufficed for venue.182
The Seventh Circuit has explained that use of a home office may serve as regular and
established if the employee “uses his home in that district as a base for his sales
activities in promoting his employer’s products.”183 The circuit has also concluded
that a “regular and established place of business” need not exist at the time the
complaint is filed, so long as it existed “at the time the cause of action accrued and

28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 197 L. Ed. 2d 816, 825 (2017) (“As
applied to domestic corporations, ‘reside[nce]’ in § 1400(b) refers only to the State of incorporation.”).
178 In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
179 Id.
180 Adam
Feldman, The Year of the Patent, EMPIRICAL SCOTUS (May 24, 2017),
https://empiricalscotus.com/2017/05/24/year-of-the-patent/.
181 Dual Mfg. & Eng’g v. Burris Indus., 531 F.2d 1382, 1388 (7th Cir. 1976).
182 Id.
183 Grantham v. Challenge-Cook Bros., 420 F.2d 1182, 1185–86 (7th Cir. 1969).
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suit is filed within a reasonable time thereafter.”184 The Sixth Circuit may provide
the most restrictive view of venue, scrutinizing a “manufacturing plant” within the
forum as insufficient.185
The First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits seem less concerned about a physical office
presence, concentrating more on the actual commercial activities within the forum.
The First Circuit did not explicate a definition for § 1400(b), but it did determine
that venue was inappropriate when the only tie to the forum was an “exclusive sales
agent” who had not sold products in the area.186 The circuit also clarified that
soliciting orders and sending them to an office outside the forum for processing did
not constitute a regular, established business.187 The Fourth Circuit defined proper
venue as “a place where business is regularly carried on.”188 The circuit has
suggested that venue is improper if the only connection is an “employee own[ing] a
home in which he carries on some of the work that he does for the defendant.”189 And
in Gaddis v. Calgon Corporation, the Fifth Circuit determined following as
persuasive for proper venue: a business division within the district, local telephone
book listings, authorization to do business within the state, inventory within the
district, and capability to fill orders within the district.190 In a case arising under the
Jones Act, the Fifth Circuit, reviewing § 1400(b), further suggested that venue might
be proper if “[i]n the doing of substantial business in an area a corporation becomes a
part of the mainstream to commerce which affects the welfare of many people
including those it may negligently injure.” 191 For that court, limiting venue to a
defendant’s principal place of business or state of incorporation would be too
restrictive.192 At least for foreign corporations, the Ninth Circuit suggested, in view
of § 1400(b), that any forum may be appropriate if “one can do a lot of business in a
foreign state on a rather mobile basis and without having any one particular place of
doing the business.”193
Doubtless returning to some variant of this precedent could enable patent
lawsuits targeting brick-and-mortar retail stores, aggressive local marketers
streamlining the ease with which to purchase products, and wholly online businesses
with local connections through a forum office. Returning to that precedent, or some
variety, begs the question of whether the second axis of the dual-axial inquiry will
swallow TC Heartland, whereby returning venue to the VE Holding epoch. The irony
would be that a previous afterthought to the venue analysis could restore the status
quo.

184 Welch Scientific Co. v. Human Engineering Institute Inc., 416 F.2d 32, 35 (7th Cir. 1969)
(citation omitted).
185 Johnson & Johnson v. Picard, 282 F.2d 386, 388 (6th Cir. 1960) (“The manufacturing plant of
Shuford cannot be regarded as Winne’s regular and established place of business.”).
186 Cordis Corp. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, 599 F.2d 1085, 1086 (1st Cir. 1979).
187 General Radio Co. v. Superior Elec. Co., 293 F.2d 949, 951 (1st Cir. 1961).
188 Holub Indus. v. Wyche, 290 F.2d 852, 854 (4th Cir. 1961).
189 Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Nopco Chem. Co., 388 F.2d 818, 820 (4th Cir. 1968).
190 Gaddis v. Calgon Corp., 449 F.2d 1318, 1320 (5th Cir. 1971).
191 Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 346 F.2d 890, 897 (5th Cir. 1965).
192 Id.
193 Bobrick Corp. v. Am. Dispenser Co., 377 F.2d 334, 338 (9th Cir. 1967).
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In the face of an outpouring of Supreme Court jurisprudence perceived by some
as solicitous to accused infringers,194 few would fault lower courts for adopting—
without the benefit of guidance from the Supreme Court—a narrow interpretation of
“regular and established business” for venue purposes.
Hewing toward the
ineluctable trajectory of Supreme Court cases in this area militates toward the
conclusion that a regular, established business is no more than a U.S. corporation’s
principal place of business or state of incorporation. Such a result much aligns with
conceptions of general jurisdiction for U.S. corporate defendants.195 A September
2016 study found that 86% of 2015 patent cases were filed outside of the defendant’s
principal place of business.196 If a decision has the de facto effect of limiting venue to
where defendants are incorporated or have an established place of business, 58% of
those cases would have been filed elsewhere under that refined regime.197
Understanding how courts could embrace a restrictive view of patent venue in toto
requires understanding how patent law has evolved in the five years before TC
Heartland.
TC Heartland marks one of many adjustments to supposed traditional views of
patent law, gravitating in the main toward a declension of patent rights.198 In
October Term 2016, the Supreme Court, perhaps avoiding contentious cases during
the liminal period in which eight justices formed the bench, heard six patent cases—
the most of any term in its recorded history.199 Reviewing broader trends over the
past 60 years, the Court seemed to balance rulings in favor of patentees (purportedly
progressive decisions) with rulings in favor of accused infringers (purportedly
competition- and business-friendly decisions).200 Since 1983 when the Federal Circuit
began to hear cases, the Court’s patent docket has steadily climbed.201 Before then,
regional circuits had a mixed distribution with many cases coming from the Seventh

194 Ronald Mann, Opinion analysis: Justices rein in Federal Circuit’s lax rules on patent venue,
SCOTUSBLOG (May. 23, 2017, 10:16 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/05/opinion-analysisjustices-rein-federal-circuits-lax-rules-patent-venue/ (“Where have I read this before: U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit—patent-holding plaintiffs win; Supreme Court – corporate
defendants win.”).
195 BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, No. 16-405, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3395, at *21 (May 30, 2017)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The majority’s approach grants a
jurisdictional windfall to large multistate or multinational corporations that operate across many
jurisdictions. Under its reasoning, it is virtually inconceivable that such corporations will ever be
subject to general jurisdiction in any location other than their principal places of business or of
incorporation.”).
196 Erin Coe, Texas in the Rearview Mirror? Glory Days Could be Numbered in the Country’s
Busiest Patent Court, LAW360 (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/905388/patentglory-days-could-be-numbered-for-east-texas.
197 Id.
198 Ronald Mann, Opinion analysis: Justices rein in Federal Circuit’s lax rules on patent venue,
SCOTUSBLOG (May. 23, 2017, 10:16 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/05/opinion-analysisjustices-rein-federal-circuits-lax-rules-patent-venue/; Adam Feldman, The Year of the Patent,
EMPIRICAL SCOTUS (May 24, 2017), https://empiricalscotus.com/2017/05/24/year-of-the-patent/ (“As
the Court has in the past, this term the decisions so far predominately move against increased
rights for patent holders.”).
199 Adam
Feldman, The Year of the Patent, EMPIRICAL SCOTUS (May 24, 2017),
https://empiricalscotus.com/2017/05/24/year-of-the-patent/.
200 See id.
201 See id.
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and Ninth Circuits.202 The increased focus on patent-related issues has stimulated
appellate practices writ large, especially for elite law firms and amicus curie
groups.203 Almost all members of the Roberts Court have contributed in this area,
with Justice Breyer penning the most opinions.204 As Professor Mann reflected, the
Federal Circuit’s record during October Term 2016 was lamentable:
The court has been deciding a steady diet of patent cases for much of the
last decade and has been rejecting the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit’s rulings in those cases almost routinely; the Federal Circuit is now
0 for 5 in the current term, by far the worst record of any of the federal
courts of appeals.205
Mann suggested that these rebukes demonstrate a bent “minded to destroy the
status quo.”206
The past five years demonstrate how the Court has reshaped patent law,
ushering jurisprudence in a coherent, singular direction.207 The Court has galvanized
accused infringers by concluding that naturally occurring genetic segments are not
patent eligible;208 processes for making natural laws are not patent eligible;209
patentees must prove infringement even as declaratory-judgment defendants;210
generic computers do not make abstract ideas patentable;211 awards of attorney’s fees
should be more easy to obtain;212 invalidity on the basis of indefiniteness requires a
mere reasonableness showing;213 patentees cannot collect royalties after patent
See id.
See id.
204 See id.
205 Ronald Mann, Opinion analysis: Federal Circuit loses again, as justices categorically reject
enforcement of post-sale patent restrictions, SCOTUSBLOG (May. 30, 2017, 4:35 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/05/opinion-analysis-federal-circuit-loses-justices-categoricallyreject-enforcement-post-sale-patent-restrictions/.
206 Id.
207 See id.
208 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013) (“For the
reasons that follow, we hold that a naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not
patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but that cDNA is patent eligible because it is not
naturally occurring.”).
209 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012) (“We must
determine whether the claimed processes have transformed these unpatentable natural laws into
patent eligible applications of those laws. We conclude that they have not done so and that
therefore the processes are not patentable.”).
210 Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 846 (2014) (“We hold that,
when a licensee seeks a declaratory judgment against a patentee to establish that there is no
infringement, the burden of proving infringement remains with the patentee.”).
211 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014) (“These cases
demonstrate that the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”).
212 Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2014); Octane Fitness,
LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1753 (2014).
213 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (“Cognizant of the
competing concerns, we read [35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶2] to require that a patent’s claims, viewed in light
of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the
invention with reasonable certainty.”).
202
203
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expiration;214 petitioners can invalidate patents in administrative proceedings
through the broadest reasonable claim construction;215 liability is limited in certain
instances when the accused component is part of a multicomponent invention;216 and
all sales—foreign or domestic—exhaust patent rights.217
Even among the cases in which patent rights have been strengthened, the Court
has done so with hesitation and on grounds that the Federal Circuit adopted an
erroneous standard.218 In a case where the Court bolstered the rights of patent
holders to seek enhanced damages, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged industry
concern over “trolls . . . often exacting outsized licensing fees on threat of
litigation.”219 In another case, the Court rejected the defense of laches but made
plain that equitable estoppel could still apply as a defense.220
Tangential to reshaping patent rights, yet consistent with a broader theme, the
Court has constricted the Federal Circuit’s appellate review. Cases in the past five
years have enabled state courts to hear claims of legal malpractice in patent law,221
established clear-error review for fact-finding during claim construction,222 required
more deference to district courts when they award attorney’s fees,223 and required
federal employees appealing from claims of discrimination and adverse action to seek
review from district courts (not the Federal Circuit).224
No doubt grounds remain for amalgamating past circuit-court decisions on what
constitutes a regular, established business. But if a de facto interpretation develops
214 Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (“What we can decide, we can
undecide. But stare decisis teaches that we should exercise that authority sparingly.”).
215 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) (“For one thing, construing a
patent claim according to its broadest reasonable construction helps to protect the public.”).
216 Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734, 737 (2017); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 435 (2016).
217 Impression Prods. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. 15-1189, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3397, at *12 (May
30, 2017) (“We conclude that a patentee’s decision to sell a product exhausts all of its patent rights
in that item, regardless of any restrictions the patentee purports to impose or the location of the
sale.”).
218 Ronald Mann, Opinion analysis: Federal Circuit loses again, as justices categorically reject
enforcement of post-sale patent restrictions, SCOTUSBLOG (May. 30, 2017, 4:35 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/05/opinion-analysis-federal-circuit-loses-justices-categoricallyreject-enforcement-post-sale-patent-restrictions/.
219 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016).
220 SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 967 (2017)
(“We note, however, as we did in [Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014)],
that the doctrine of equitable estoppel provides protection against some of the problems that First
Quality highlights, namely, unscrupulous patentees inducing potential targets of infringement suits
to invest in the production of arguably infringing products.”).
221 Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1968 (2013) (“In this case, although the state courts must
answer a question of patent law to resolve Minton’s legal malpractice claim, their answer will have
no broader effects.”).
222 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 840 (2015) (“Now that we have set
forth why the Federal Circuit must apply clear error review when reviewing subsidiary fact-finding
in patent claim construction, it is necessary to explain how the rule must be applied in that
context.”).
223 Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2014); Octane Fitness,
LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1753 (2014).
224 Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41 (2012) (“Should an employee seeking judicial review then file
a petition in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or instead bring a suit in district court
under the applicable antidiscrimination law? We hold she should go to district court.”).
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in which U.S. corporations can be sued for patent infringement only in their states of
incorporation or principal places of business, constitutional concerns inure about
whether the venue statute, as applied, denies patentees access to courts to assert
rights derived from the Constitution.225
B. How a Narrow Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) Could Invite Constitutional
Challenges in Cases Where the Right to Access to Courts Is Denied
Confronted with an unblemished line of jurisprudence seemingly attendant to
constricting patent rights,226 few would castigate lower courts for following that trend
and adopting a narrow interpretation of “regular and established business” for venue
purposes.227 In all instances the Supreme Court will have the final word on the scope
of that venue provision if the justices decide to exercise discretionary review on the
issue. No doubt TC Heartland could shield small businesses from defending against
lawsuits in hostile courts, but the case might presage an unconstitutional burden on
their right to access to courts.
If an unyielding interpretation develops in which a U.S. corporation can be sued
for patent infringement only in its state of incorporation or principal place of
business, constitutional concerns metastasize about whether the venue statute, as
applied, denies patentees access to courts to assert rights derived from the
Constitution.228 When the financial rigors of litigating in one of two choices for venue
become onerous enough to chill a patentee’s ordinary firmness to prosecute, that
patentee should consider arguing that the venue statute, as applied, deprives
meaningful access to the judiciary. For a struggling West Virginian small business
acting in good faith to assert its patents, it should not have to choose between a
lawsuit in Cupertino, California, and watching the exploitation of its inventions to
pecuniary detriment.229
Unlike many federal causes of action, a lawsuit predicted on patent
infringement is a creature of statute under an explicit constitutional construct.230
Article I of the Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”231 Although Congress

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Ronald Mann, Opinion analysis: Justices rein in Federal Circuit’s lax rules on patent venue,
SCOTUSBLOG (May. 23, 2017, 10:16 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/05/opinion-analysisjustices-rein-federal-circuits-lax-rules-patent-venue/.
227 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
228 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
229 Cf. Impression Prods. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. 15-1189, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3397 (May 30,
2017) (involving accused patent infringer Impression Products as a West Virginia small business);
Adam Liptak &Vindu Goel, Supreme Court Rules Patent Laws Can’t Be Used to Prevent Reselling,
THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/30/business/supreme-courtpatent-rights-lexmark.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fadamliptak&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=l
atest&contentPlacement=7&pgtype=collection.
230 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 271.
231 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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could issue patents as special statutes,232 the modern approach authorizes the
Executive Branch to issue patents when certain statutory requirements are met.233
Justice Thomas has described a patent as “an official document reflecting a grant by
a sovereign that is made public.”234 A patentee holds a public right to “governmentcreated privileges,”235 producing the “regulatory effect” of restraining others from
practicing the patent for a specified period of time.236 Dissuading the exercise of a
public right benefiting society should be viewed with suspicion, engendering
questions about when the right to access to courts is circumscribed.237
Under federal common law, the Supreme Court observed in 1947 that “the
plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.”238 Although much has been
said about a defendant’s due-process right to ward off lawsuits filed in distance
lands,239 a plaintiff’s right to access to courts is less developed.240 In 2002, Justice
David H. Souter catalogued cases since Reconstruction, grounding the right to access
to courts on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Petition Clause of
the First Amendment, Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.241 Justice Souter did not suggest that the right to access to
courts emanates from “penumbras” of other rights,242 and the Court made manifest in
2011 that at least “the Petition Clause protects the right of individuals to appeal to
courts and other forums established by the government for resolution of legal

Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 14 How. 539, 549–50 (1853).
See 35 U.S.C. § 151; Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 847 (2015)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
234 Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 847 (citation omitted).
235 Id. at 848 n.2 (citation omitted).
236 Id. at 847 (citation omitted).
237 See id. (“Provoked by the Crown’s use of these so-called ‘monopoly patents’ to promote
private economic interests over innovation and beneficial commerce, Parliament enacted the Statute
of Monopolies in 1624.” (citation omitted)); CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1321
(Fed. Cir. 2013)
Reliable application of legal principles underlies the economic incentive purpose of
patent law, in turn implementing the benefits to the public of technology-based
advances, and the benefits to the nation of industrial activity, employment, and
economic growth. Today’s irresolution concerning section 101 affects not only this
court and the trial courts, but also the PTO examiners and agency tribunals, and
all who invent and invest in new technology. The uncertainty of administrative
and judicial outcome and the high cost of resolution are a disincentive to both
innovators and competitors.
238 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
239 See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985) (“The Due Process
Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a
forum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’” (citation omitted)).
240 Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (“However unsettled the basis of the
constitutional right of access to courts, our cases rest on the recognition that the right is ancillary to
the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of
court.” (internal footnote omitted)).
241 Id. at 425 n.12.
242 Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 627 n.5 (1990) (“The notion that the
Constitution, through some penumbra emanating from the Privileges and Immunities Clause and
the Commerce Clause, establishes this Court as a Platonic check upon the society’s greedy
adherence to its traditions can only be described as imperious.”).
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disputes.”243 While the animating constitutional provision has wavered, the Court
has made axiomatic that a “fundamental right of access to the courts” exists.244
The Court has often placed the Speech Clause and Petition Clause on similar
footing, but the founders believed that the right to petition was different from the
right to speak.245 The right to “petition the Government for redress of grievances”
has roots dating back 800 years to the Magna Carta as well as the English Bill of
Rights of 1689, both long before the American Revolution.246 The Declaration of
Independence justified the American Revolution, in part, by proclaiming that King
George III had repeatedly ignored petitions for redress of colonial grievances: “In
every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble
terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury.”247 As
commentators recount, founding-era representatives felt obliged to engage and
respond to petitions, which could be submitted not only by eligible voters but also by
women, slaves, and aliens:
John Quincy Adams, after being defeated for a second term as President,
became elected to the House of Representatives where he provoked a near
riot on the House floor by presenting petitions from slaves seeking their
freedom. The House leadership responded by imposing a “gag rule” limiting
petitions, which repudiated as unconstitutional by the House in 1844.248
The Court has “recognized this right to petition as one of ‘the most precious of
the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights, and [has] explained that the right is
implied by ‘the very idea of a government, republican in form.’”249 In United States v.
Cruikshank, the Court observed that the government cannot eliminate access for
redress of grievances.250 In Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, Justice Kennedy noted
that the right to petition is the purest form of seeking recognition of new rights: “The
right to petition is in some sense the source of other fundamental rights, for petitions
have provided a vital means for citizens to request recognition of new rights and to
assert existing rights against the sovereign.”251 Justice Antonin Scalia’s separate
opinion in that case further supports the conception of a right to resolve disputes:
“[T]he primary responsibility of colonial assemblies was the settlement of private
disputes raised by petitions.”252 In Christopher v. Harbury, Justice Souter explicated
that “the essence of the access claim is that official action is presently denying an
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 387 (2011).
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004).
245 See Burt Neuborne, Reading the First Amendment As a Whole, NATIONAL CONSTITUTION
CENTER, http://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-i/assemblyand-petition-neuborne/interp/34 (last visited Sept. 23, 2016).
246 John Inazu & Burt Neuborne, Right to Assemble and Petition, NATIONAL CONSTITUTION
CENTER, http://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-i/assemblyand-petition-joint/interp/34 (last visited Sept. 29, 2016).
247 Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 396 (citations omitted).
248 Inzau & Neuborne, supra note 246.
249 BE&K Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 536 U.S. 516, 524–25 (2002) (internal
citations omitted).
250 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552–53 (1876).
251 Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 388 (citations omitted).
252 Id. at 404 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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opportunity to litigate for a class of potential plaintiffs.”253 The idea “is to place the
plaintiff in a position to pursue a separate claim for relief once the frustrating
condition has been removed.”254
Governmental obstruction to bringing a lawsuit is one form of denying the right
to access to courts, but another rests in the notion of prejudicing impecunious
plaintiffs.255 In the context of patent law, the vulnerable parties unable to file
lawsuits in California or Delaware are small businesses or individuals struggling to
make ends meet while watching without meaningful recourse possible infringers
acquire greater market share.
As Justice Scalia reflected in Lewis v. Casey, when discerning impedance on the
right to access to courts, “meaningful access to the courts is the touchstone.”256 The
contours of meaningful access are elusive, but the Court has not hesitated in setting
a low threshold for meaningful access in the context of prisoners seeking to vindicate
constitutional violations.257 The Court reminds that the “injury requirement is not
satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim,”258 reasoning that no government
should be compelled to provide litigants with “the wherewithal to transform
themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder
derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims.”259 Justice Scalia directed that reasoning to
assisting prisoners, and its application to an onerous venue provision is uncertain.
Federal common law provides a gloss to understanding when compelling a
distant venue for litigation affronts the right to access to courts.260 Although not
constitutional law, the Court’s jurisprudence in the area of forum-selection clauses
under federal law informs the types of injuries that patentees must demonstrate
when forced to sue in places far removed.261 Assuming that a contractually mandated
forum is given equal footing to a statutorily mandated forum, challenging severely
limited options for bringing a lawsuit demands the “heavy burden” of showing “the
Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413 (2002).
Id.
255 Id. at 420–23 (citations omitted); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 368 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)
Prior to [Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)], two lines of cases dominated our
so-called ‘access to the courts’ jurisprudence. One of these lines, rooted largely in
principles of equal protection, invalidated state filing and transcript fees and
imposed limited affirmative obligations on the States to ensure that their criminal
procedures did not discriminate on the basis of poverty. These cases recognized a
right to equal access, and any affirmative obligations imposed (e.g., a free
transcript or counsel on a first appeal as of right) were strictly limited to ensuring
equality of access, not access in its own right. In a second line of cases, we
invalidated state prison regulations that restricted or effectively prohibited
inmates from filing habeas corpus petitions or civil rights lawsuits in federal court
to vindicate federally protected rights.
(citations omitted).
256 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
257 Id. at 353–55.
258 Id. at 354.
259 Id. at 355.
260 Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590 (1991) (“We begin by noting the
boundaries of our inquiry. First, this is a case in admiralty, and federal law governs the
enforceability of the forum-selection clause we scrutinize.”).
261 Id.
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chosen forum is seriously inconvenient for the trial of the action.”262 A plaintiff
carries this heavy burden by showing the “forum will be so gravely difficult and
inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.”263
Good reasons exist that the burden would be less when challenging 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b) because forum-selection clauses are consensual, whereas no patentee
agrees in advance against whom its infringers will be in a lawsuit.
Small businesses and individuals holding the right to sue in patent are situated
to advance as-applied challenges to narrow interpretations of the patent venue
statute. “[A] nascent or struggling” party can bring an as-applied challenge when
application of law precludes the particularized exercise of a constitutional right.264
The proposed machination could materialize as a declaratory-judgment action,
requesting the district court to conclude that (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is
unconstitutional as applied and (2) venue is proper in that forum under 28 U.S.C. §
1391 for a patent-infringement lawsuit.265 Harmonizing concepts on when a plaintiff
can prevail in demonstrating a denial of access to courts, precedent suggests that a
patentee could overcome a limiting interpretation of proper venue by demonstrating
the financial inability to assert in good faith a public right in an inconvenient forum
against an accused infringer flouting asserted claims.
If the prevailing consensus becomes that accused infringers can be sued only in
their state of corporation or principal place of business, such a restriction stands
apart from all other civil lawsuits involving U.S defendants.266 No civil cause of
action tips so heavily in favor of defendants, at least in the context of venue selection.
Although the Court of International Trade is located in New York, New York, it is a
court of exclusive jurisdiction over international transactions and border disputes.267
Similar logic holds true for the International Trade Commission in Washington,
D.C.268 That Congress has prescribed a limited view of permissible locales for venue
in patent disputes does not mollify the constitutional implications of circumscribing a
patentee’s willingness to bring a lawsuit for patent infringement.269 Doubtless
Congress has authority to limit venue, but some Article III check must occur when
those limitations prevent small businesses or persons of modest means from
contemplating assertion of their rights. The advent of contingency-fee representation
and pro bono legal assistance does not displace the Court’s jurisprudence that
meaningful opportunity to petition the government for redress of grievances must
exist.270 The small business owner who watches the exploitation of her invention to
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 16, 19 (1972).
Id. at 18.
264 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 159 (2003) (majority opinion), overruled on
other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010); see also Doe v.
Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194 (2010) (noting that an “as applied” challenge seeks to strike down
applications limited to the “particular circumstances of these plaintiffs”).
265 28 U.S.C. § 2201; Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 (“The existence of another adequate remedy does not
preclude a declaratory judgment that is otherwise appropriate. The court may order a speedy
hearing of a declaratory-judgment action.”).
266 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
267 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1581.
268 See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
269 Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 566 (1942) (“Furthermore, the Act of
1897 was a restrictive measure, limiting a prior, broader venue.”).
270 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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pecuniary detriment would take cold comfort in knowing that contingency fees or free
legal services might be available for litigation across the country. Our Constitution
demands more, and nothing from prior precedent suggests that the availability of
alternative-fee arrangements salves a denied constitutional right. A convenient
forum accounts for both sides; it should not overly favor the well-heeled.271
If courts settle on a narrow interpretation of “regular and established business”
for venue purposes,272 small business and individuals inhibited from exercising legal
rights under patent law still have recourse. A struggling business can assert an asapplied challenge to a venue provision that limits forum selection to either of two
locations, none of which offering a pragmatic opportunity to obtain relief.
V. CONCLUSION
Frabjous273 celebration simpliciter is premature for accused patent infringers in
the wake of TC Heartland. Semisonic’s admonition in Closing Time is more apt:
“Every new beginning comes from some other beginning’s end.”274 TC Heartland
marks the end of one epoch in patent law, but augurs a revitalized debate about
proper venue. The beachhead established by East Texas—amid volleys of mandamus
petitions to compel transfer to other venues—has been shaken.275 Whether the East
Texas ramparts endure, or whether New York, California, and Delaware emerge as
patent-law epicenters, is not apparent in the immediate aftershock.
The enduring imprints of TC Heartland will be both what the case resolved and
what remains tabled for additional review. The case interpreted one axis of a dualaxial venue provision.
That the Court declined to address foreign entities,
unincorporated entities, and the regular-and-established-business clause of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b) leaves much to learn and discern.276
If past is prologue, a narrow interpretation of “regular and established
business” could be inexorable.277 Should that narrow interpretation impose a de facto
situation in which U.S. corporate defendants can be sued only in their state of
incorporation or principal place of business, small businesses and individuals would

See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 19.
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
273 I discovered the word “frabjous” while listening to a podcast in May 2017. The Talking TED
Talks
Edition,
SLATE
MONEY,
(May
6,
2017),
http://www.slate.com/articles/podcasts/moneybox/2017/05/cathy_o_neil_s_ted_talk_what_goes_on_at
_ted_talks_conferences_and_the_industry.html. I am now dedicated to promoting its usage.
Frabjous, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2016) (“wonder”; “extraordinary”).
274 SEMISONIC, Closing Time, on FEELING STRANGELY FINE (MCA 1998).
275 In re Google Inc., No. 2017-107, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4848, at *8–9 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 23, 2017)
(“For the foregoing reasons, it was a clear abuse of discretion for the district court to conclude that
the Northern District of California is not clearly the more convenient forum. We therefore grant
Google’s requested relief and instruct the district court to transfer the case to the Northern District
of California.”).
276 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 197 L. Ed. 2d 816, 821 n.1, 824 n.2
(2017).
277 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
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do well to remember the appellation of “Equal Justice Under Law.”278 TC Heartland
may shield small businesses from defending against lawsuits in hostile courts, but
the case might portend an unconstitutional burden on their right to access to courts.
Confronted with the choice between exercising a legal right derived from the
Constitution and a financially ruinous position of filing a lawsuit in one of two costprohibitive locations, an as-applied impingement arises on the right to access to
courts. TC Heartland taken to a pernicious degree solves one problem while creating
another for vulnerable parties. The patent world will understand in full TC
Heartland with time, but let us hope that small businesses do not suffer and lose in
effect the ability to assert their patent rights.

278 Visitor’s Guide to the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/visiting/visitorsguide-supremecourt.aspx (last visited May 11, 2017)
(“Its charge, emblazoned over the doors of this building, is to ensure ‘Equal Justice Under Law.’”).

